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As one of most important scholars dedicated to the theme of genocide in 
Argentina, Daniel Feierstein in his recent book discusses critically the need 
to construct a conceptual framework to expand the current understanding of 
genocide, as well as to explain how it operates in a context of instability and 
uncertainty. Two of the guiding themes that are addressed throughout this 
pungent book are to what extent the Nazi regime may be equated to the Juntas 
that appeared in Argentina, and what are the effects of memory in political 
life.
Readers who wish to open Genocide as a Social Practice will find a major 
dilemma discussed in the introductory chapters: should a new definition 
of genocide be created to incorporate the ideas and practices of the bloody 
dictatorship which occurred in 1976 and 1982 in Argentina, and can this 
dictatorship be ethically and legally compared to Nazism in Germany? 
The introductory chapters remind us that genocide was a neologism coined 
by Lemkin which became a legal term according to the United Nations in 
1948 to describe a deliberate attempt to systematically destroy an entire 
population because of their ethnic, racial or religious characteristics. This 
definition means that the term can only with great difficulty be extrapolated to 
the Latin American situation. In its original draft, this project acknowledges 
that the “Argentine genocide” does not correspond to the classic definition 
of ethnic cleansing in view of the fact that the military-forces involved were 
moved by ideological goals. From its onset, the declaration refuses to consider 
ideology as a motive for extermination or genocide. Based on the doctrine of 
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national security, army-forces searched, jailed and exterminated any agents 
who could represent a centre of infection for social scaffolding. Alluding to 
the metaphor of disciplinary power in foucaultian terms, Feierstein runs the 
risk of re-opening the discussion about whether to reconsider the meaning 
given to normalcy and pathology. Modern institutions have developed new 
economies to control certain bodies. Visualizing skills and bodies as a form 
of control alludes to meeting the needs of individuality, but the paradox is that 
at the same time it re-constructs a non-egalitarian form of power. Normalcy is 
based on the production of pathology, and vice-versa. 
Unless otherwise resolved, the Juntas developed disciplinary practices 
of extreme violence based on the ideology of the victims, not their race. 
Supported by extreme, left-wing Catholic sectors, the state envisaged Marxist 
ideology to be a significant threat that required defeating. This pathological 
form of thought became rooted at the core of society. The struggle against 
“domestic subversion” became a priority for the Argentine government. The 
‘red-scare’ typically presented Juntas with a great quandary; how should they 
treat prisoners? 
In his efforts to adjust the concept of crime towards the jurisprudence of 
genocide, Feierstein is required to forge a new definition of genocide which 
goes beyond the boundaries of that formulated by United Nation a half 
century ago. Most certainly, this work shows the importance of formulating a 
new definition of genocide by adding political violence as a criterion for the 
obliteration of peoples. The declaration of the UN in 1948, in fact, did not 
allow that one reason for genocide may very well be to apply in extremis the 
ideology of the victims themselves. For this reason it is necessary not only to 
reopen the still hot debate about the tactics and techniques the Juntas used to 
keep order, but also to re-examine how these types of events are repressed or 
memorized. 
In opposition to other specialized perspectives, Feierstein brilliantly 
suggests that any “genocide practice” is embedded within a much broader 
process that never ends. An act of genocide refers not only to practices of 
violence but also to meanings that are conferred to understanding such events. 
What is highly interesting to consider is why Feierstein does not seem to be 
in agreement with the classical definition of genocide. 
He would reply with the observation that if the law supports the proposition 
that  egalitarian conditions to every citizen be considered equal, excluding 
some victims in the declaration according to their characteristics does not 
correspond with the nature of Roman rights. Jurisprudence after WWII 
evaluated and contemplated recognised that some states would not accept 
the UN´s declaration in view of their own territorial disputes with other 
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minorities within their territories. Although the United Nations was formed 
to prevent a repeat of the holocaust, the declarations it produced failed to 
control the crimes of nation-states against their own populations. In addition, 
the declaration recreates significant legal asymmetry between citizens. This 
final document not only contrasts bases of legality (since the crime should 
not be valorised by the characteristics of its victims), but also engenders the 
existence of a hierarchy of potential victims.
The paradoxical situation rests on the idea that nation-states have reserved 
the right to a monopoly of violence that can be exerted on their respective 
populations - even minorities or vulnerable civilians. Needless to say, in an 
age when crimes were committed through commitment to ideologies, a law 
which determined the protection of victims in accordance with their racial 
character was out of context. If crimes that are committed against civilians 
because of their religion (a system of ideas) are banned, then why was the 
concept of ideology excluded from the declaration? 
With this in mind, Feierstein leads the point of discussion to another place. 
The torture, forced disappearances and acts of violence planned by the Juntas 
in Argentina, Feierstein states, should be typified as acts of genocide. Like 
the Nazis, the Argentine military deprived persons of their rights through the 
articulation of diverse mechanisms which ranged from psychological torture 
to death. Although they looked to avoid any charge that their crimes were 
ethically motivated, it is important to see that this problem is based on the 
dichotomy between being and doing. 
In Argentina, potential victims were selected because of their supposed 
participation in civilian armies. They were not killed because they belonged 
to a certain race or ethnicity or because of any biological differences. 
Feierstein clarifies that there are commonalities to both processes, such as the 
reduction of others according to “degenerative logic”. Like Nazism, the Juntas 
developed a disciplinary allegory to promote the story that the population (the 
“insurgents”) were a cancer, a degenerative agent which should be extirpated 
for the wellbeing of the wider community. Their success in promoting the 
idea of the need to maintain the purity of ones’ own species corresponded 
with the success they had in manipulating and assassinating systematically 
those ‘germs’ that had a dysfunctional effect on the whole. The ‘character’ 
or temper of their prisoners (in Argentina as well as in Germany) was 
undoubtedly irreversible. Once captured, imprisoned and tortured inmates 
have no opportunity to change their ideology or compromise or to abandon 
the fight. Genocide, as a form of discipline, makes all men egalitarian - to 
their deaths. 
The disciplinary treatment for Jews in concentration camps was the 
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same applied to Argentine insurgents. Defined as technology of power, 
the practice of genocide was aimed at reorganizing social life. To expand 
the new ideology, the old one required eradicating, along with former 
practices in the public sphere. The main thesis of this valuable book is in 
the recognition that genocide resorts to establishing new discontinuities as a 
“re-organizing practice”. A return to democracy after a dictatorship collapses 
not only fails to recover memory but also imposes a new doctrine. Based 
on the assumption that military forces and militias fought a war, the theory 
of two demons constructs a hegemonic discourse that orients itself around 
blaming the victim. At the end, though, and only to some extent, Feierstein 
has success in resolving the limitations which have historically surfaced in 
specialised literature by comparing the Nazi regime with the Juntas. However 
insofar as the practice of extreme violence dissuades witnesses and the rest 
of population from accepting policies that would otherwise would accepted, 
some conceptual problems arise. In his effort to demonstrate the hypotheses 
stated in first chapters of the book, Feierstein may be putting the horse before 
the cart, and even misunderstanding genocide as violence.  
First and foremost, the loyalties of civilians to Adolf Hitler and Jorge 
Rafael Videla were multifarious. Feierstein does not clearly appreciate the 
conceptual difference between a totalitarian and an authoritarian government. 
While the former subordinates all private life to the public space (which is 
monopolized by a one sided-perspective) the latter signals trouble as a tool 
to control private lives. The inability of the Juntas to successfully manage 
the economy and politics resulted in a significant failure to exert total control 
over the civility, which never adopted the mandate of the Juntas or the view of 
extreme insurgents. In the case of Germany, however, devotion to the leader 
was complete to the extent that it allowed a total war to be conducted beyond 
the boundaries of the nation. As F. Timmermann (2008) put it, the Latino 
American citizen withdraws from the public space when pressed by the 
violence of state. This process facilitated the adoption of neoliberal policies a 
couple of decades later due to the indifference of worker unions. The inability 
of lay-citizens to prevent violence determined their lack of interest in politics. 
In view of this, the second difference consists in the total commitment of 
army forces with the cause of the Junta. From soldiers to generals, militias 
in Argentina believed they were fighting against a great evil. Their victory 
would represent the harmonization of nation and home. John Kekes is not 
wrong when says “while Argentine soldiers were fully committed in their 
mythical crusade, Nazis preferred not to be in contact with camp’s inmates”. 
Observations like this led Hanna Arendt to coin a neologism, “the banality 
of evil”, to express cynical indifference to another’s fate as a subject of 
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ethics. The lack of critical thought which characterized the outlook of many 
Nazis stands in opposition to that of the Argentines. Furthermore, if Hitler 
was democratically elected by popular vote, Videla took power by replacing 
the constitutional rights, the senate and other democratic institutions with a 
new form of authoritarian government. Nonetheless, the authoritarian view 
in politics was functional economic liberalism. Employed to disintegrate 
the struggles of the workers’ unions, violence destroyed the will to ask for 
international help from abroad. This text does not evaluate with clarity the 
pervasive role of the major financial powers (US and Europe) in issuing 
credit to non-democratic governments at the time as they denounced Videla´s 
regime for violating human rights. The same tactics persisted over the 
following decades, generating financial dependency between the centre and 
peripheral nations. 
Feierstein ignores the tragic outcome of subversion in Argentina before the 
coup d’état. By 1974 almost 200 political crimes had been perpetrated by civil 
armies; this number had risen to 860 by 1975. During 1973-1976, the 1358 
deaths that had resulted through terrorist attacks had taken the lives of 677 
civilians, 180 policemen and 66 military officers. By trivializing the degree 
of violence exerted by the different actors, Feierstein imposes the same biased 
argument he criticizes the UN for making in its declaration. If the document 
determines that crimes of genocide are defined by the characteristics of 
its victims, Feierstein assumes that the responsibility of state and civilians 
depends on their strength and not on the crimes they committed. Even if the 
Juntas conducted disgusting crimes against citizens without being legally 
bought to account, it is important to understand the ideology they employed 
which led to the sentiment that they were superior to civilian governments. 
Historically, in Latin America military forces have reserved the right to 
intervene in politics directly or indirectly when civilians cannot keep order in 
their homeland (Kekes, 1985). 
Last but not least, the partial view of Feierstein regarding memory (the 
trivialization of the violence exerted by civil militias or insurgents on other 
targets) does not allow the formulation of an accurate, all-encompassing 
model of human rights. The conceptual limitation of human rights, as they 
are delineated by author, refers to the following axiom. 
Whenever human rights are preserved as universal values we meet with 
ethical problems concerning the autonomy of cultures and other nations. We 
start from the premise that after the XX century almost all genocides were 
committed by states which should supposedly have protected victims. The 
concept of autonomy is not a category of modernity, as Feierstein obstinately 
insists, but the legal exception to guarantees of human rights. Despite the 
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international denunciation of the US of systematic human rights violations, 
this stance indicates adherence to the principle of self-determination to avoid 
any criticism from external nations. The same happened in Argentina where 
the government imposed a biased set of human rights to encourage restrictive 
policies that limit democracy and free speech. 
To put it bluntly, rights and duties are not the only key factors of a legal 
system, but they offset the benefits and costs of keeping societal order. 
Legally, if human rights are thought of as universal and applicable to all 
nations, we need to think of the role of the common duty to uphold them as 
well. Homogenizing of all duty in this regard concentrates authority in one 
state. The loyalties of citizenry to their respective states are based on respect 
for rights. If a group does not respect common rights, the state employs the 
violence necessary to intervene, perhaps in international affairs. When we 
re-state that human rights are not local but universal, we must accept that a 
third police state should emerge. This new powerful state will grant safety 
in the periphery while the centre remains untouched. Having the strength to 
intervene in the politics of other nations exempts the third power of being 
charged with having a policy of intervention. Philosophically speaking, the 
adoption of human rights as a universal value paves the way for the advent 
of the dictatorship of human rights. Moreover, this book does not properly 
examine the roots of terrorism (as a dialectic of hate when an state employs 
torture as instrument of dissuasion in view of its inability to otherwise keep 
order, or in the form of a group of insurgents using violence to vindicate its 
claims). The surprise factor, combined with fear and extortion, means that 
terrorism is very difficult to understand. Terrorism is rooted in the same logic 
as democracy (Korstanje, 2013). 
Let me explain that, in the tragedy of the disappeared, those who were 
tortured did not chose their destiny. They were forced in a context of violence 
to become anonymous and fall out of the reach of legal jurisprudence. In 
these types of events, the paradox is that the state systematically kills 
civilians who are supposedly in its custody. Anthropologically, the problem 
with disappearance is that it signals the lack of a body. Human existence is 
determined by the presence of death. As a souvenir, the existence of a body 
serves in funerary rites and rituals to avoid the disintegration of community. 
Ancestors are mediators between this world and the hereafter and are enigmas 
to the human existence. In the context of disasters such as those described, 
people may understand that, after all, they survived. Their mourning and loss 
are not in vain because they are still alive. To understand what happened, 
survivors weave a narrative based on their exemplarity and superiority. To the 
question ‘why did we survive?’ emerges the response ‘because of our moral 
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strength, our civic or cultural superiority’. This type of reaction in sedentary 
societies creates positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, it 
facilitates the process of recovery for survivors (resilience) as well as offering 
psychological therapy for their losses. On the other hand, if these mechanisms 
of resilience are replicated in the long-term, or become ideologized into the 
apparatus of the state, they may lead to over-valorisation of the survivor’s 
assets. As a result, expressions of nationalism and chauvinism may emerge to 
create a biased version of memory, silencing the real reasons for tragedy. Since 
the problem is not tackled, the tragedy will come back in the near future. If 
we think of survivors of dictatorship as heroes, we will never understand the 
situation. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that, whenever political 
ideology and memory are linked, new hegemonic forms of power surface. 
The concept of exeptionalism in the survivor’s mind, if not corrected, may 
lead to a restricted view of reality because the self thinks that happiness may 
be reached through the (re)introduction of suffering.
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